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ESSAY: POST-CONVICTION 
DEATH PENALTY INVESTIGATIONS: 
THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATORS 
Laurie L. Levenson* 
 Currently, no standards guide the police or prosecutors on when 
they should appoint new investigators to conduct post-conviction 
investigations. One would hope that common sense would lead them to 
use independent investigators—as opposed to those with conflicts of 
interest—without a formal rule dictating that they had to do so. 
Evidence, however, suggests otherwise. This Essay discusses why it is 
essential to institute more formal guidelines to maintain the fairness 
and integrity of the justice system. 
 In addition to the condemned inmates whose cases are often the 
focus of such post-conviction investigations, 140,000 inmates are 
currently serving sentences of life imprisonment. There is a tremendous 
need to ensure that everyone in prison—not just those sentenced to be 
executed—has been afforded a fair trial. This Essay suggests that new 
investigators should be assigned to all nonfrivolous claims of police or 
prosecutorial misconduct. The criminal justice system needs a conflict-
of-interest standard to ensure that only the guilty remain convicted. 
 
 * David W. Burcham Chair in Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I am 
grateful to the work of my Research Assistant Kate Kaso and the helpful commentary by faculty 
at the University of Kansas Law School. This Essay was inspired by current efforts to revise the 
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice. In a recent work, Conflicts 
over Conflicts: Challenges in Redrafting the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on Conflicts of 
Interest, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 879 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1746848, I 
discussed the forty most pressing questions to be considered when redrafting the ethical standards 
governing prosecutors and defense lawyers’ conflicts of interests. Id. at 881. One of those 
essential questions is: “Should prosecutors be responsible for conflicts of interest among law 
enforcement personnel?” Id. at 897. 
  I am deeply honored to contribute to this special issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review. This issue honors the work and career of an extraordinary jurist and mentor, the 
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón. Judge Alarcón has committed his life to helping others. 
Thankfully, I have been one of the many beneficiaries of his wisdom and generosity. He is a man 
of integrity, courage, and truth. He has worked tirelessly to improve the American justice system. 
Judge Alarcón makes us ask the hard questions. More importantly, he helps us answer them. 
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“The basis of effective government is public confidence, 
and that confidence is endangered when ethical standards 
falter or appear to falter.” 
—Special Message to Congress on Conflict-of-Interest 
Legislation and on Problems of Ethics in Government, 
PUB. PAPERS 326 (Apr. 27, 1961)1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the public and criminal justice system contemplates how to 
proceed with the death penalty in America, one issue demands 
everyone’s attention: Who should conduct post-conviction 
investigations? Generally, prosecutors use the same officers who 
handled the original investigation in a case investigating a 
defendant’s post-conviction claims. The reason for this is obvious. 
The original investigating officers are most familiar with the facts of 
the case and using them can save time and costs in the post-
conviction investigation. 
But there is a danger in using the original investigating officers 
to conduct post-conviction investigations, especially when the cases 
involve claims of prosecutorial misconduct or failures to disclose 
exculpatory evidence. In such situations, officers are put in the 
situation of investigating their own alleged misconduct or that of 
their partners. A natural conflict of interest arises that may skew that 
investigation and will certainly undermine confidence in it. 
Currently, no standards guide the police or prosecutors on when 
they should appoint individual investigators to conduct particular 
post-conviction investigations. Officers are left to investigate cases 
in which they have already secured convictions, knowing that if a 
defendant’s challenges are proved true, it will jeopardize an officer’s 
own reputation and credibility. While some progress has been made 
in the civil rights area to assign independent officers to investigate 
allegations of police misconduct, the same is not true for 
investigations of post-conviction petitions for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
 1. The need for effective conflict-of-interest rules, especially for public employees, was 
highlighted by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 
U.S. 520 (1961): “[Conflict-of-interest laws are] directed at an evil which endangers the fabric of 
a democratic society, for democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who 
govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in 
activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption.” Id. at 562. 
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Both the courts and prosecutors have a duty to adopt rules regarding 
the conduct of post-conviction investigations so that prosecutors 
continue to pursue the goal of finding the truth, rather than just 
rebutting defense allegations. 
This Essay examines why there is a need for standards to guide 
prosecutors and law enforcement in post-conviction investigations. It 
also suggests what those standards should be. This issue affects more 
than just death penalty cases. With over 140,000 Americans serving 
life imprisonment, 2 there is a tremendous need to ensure that 
everyone in prison—not just those sentenced to be executed—has 
been afforded a fair trial. As post-conviction challenges soar, 3 so 
does the concern that innocent persons have been wrongfully 
convicted. 
Reliable post-conviction investigations help prosecutors decide 
how to respond to claims of wrongful conviction. Most petitioners 
for habeas corpus never receive a hearing.4 For many petitioners, 
informal negotiations offer the best hope for a remedy. If the defense 
can get the prosecutor to admit flaws in the original proceedings, 
which they only do when their own investigators verify the defense’s 
allegations, then there is hope for a retrial or even exoneration. 
However, if the prosecution’s investigators dig in their heels and 
refuse to give a fresh look at the case, the defendant’s task becomes 
Herculean. 
As this Essay suggests, prosecutors can take at least one 
immediate step to ensure that post-conviction reviews are not stalled. 
When a nonfrivolous post-conviction challenge claims police or 
prosecutorial misconduct—especially if there are allegations of 
faulty identification and interviewing procedures—then new 
investigators should be assigned to evaluate those claims. Trial 
investigators have too much invested to fairly and objectively 
evaluate their own work. The criminal justice system needs a 
conflict-of-interest standard to ensure that only the guilty remain 
convicted. 
 
 2. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences 
in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27–32 (2010). 
 3. In 2010 alone, more than 17,000 habeas corpus petitions were filed in federal court. See 
Joseph L. Hoffman & Nancy J. King, Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 2011, at WK8. 
 4. Id. 
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II.  THE PROBLEM 
To understand the problem with conflicted investigators, it is 
helpful to look at the issue both from the perspective of what 
happens in an individual case and from the broader perspective of 
how many cases are being impacted by wrongful investigative 
procedures. As described in the next two sections of this Essay, an 
officer’s conflict of interest can derail justice in the most serious of 
cases, including those involving defendants in capital cases. 
A.  A Case Study: People v. Reggie Cole & Obie Anthony5 
To understand the impact of investigators’ conflicts of interest, 
consider the case of People v. Reggie Cole & Obie Anthony. Sixteen 
years ago, Reggie Cole and Obie Anthony were convicted of murder. 
They both claimed that they were wrongfully convicted, and they 
each filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Cole’s petition was 
recently granted, and he has been released from custody; Anthony, 
however, still awaits his day in court. 
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Anthony claimed that 
his conviction was based on misidentifications and false testimony 
secured by the police detectives. As too often happens, the 
prosecutor evaluating Anthony’s post-conviction claims of innocence 
and investigative misconduct asked the same investigator originally 
assigned to his case, and now accused of misconduct, to do the post-
conviction investigation. This same detective was sent back to ask 
witnesses questions such as: “Did I unfairly pressure or trick you into 
making your identification?” “Did I tap on photographs when you 
were asked to make your investigations, like the defense now 
claims?” Not surprisingly, her post-conviction investigation cleared 
her of all wrongdoing and returned the prosecution’s witnesses to 
their original positions. But there is good reason to doubt her 
findings. 
To understand why, consider the facts of the case: Anthony and 
Cole were convicted in 1995 of the murder and attempted robbery of 
Felipe Gonzales at 11:30 p.m. on March 27, 1994. The shooting
 
 5. People v. Cole & Anthony, No. BA097736 (L.A. County Super. Ct. 1995). 
 took 
place in front of a whorehouse in South-Central Los Angeles, an area 
plagued with gangs, crack houses, and nearly daily murders. 6 There 
 6. These facts are based on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Anthony and 
  
SPECIAL ISSUE]            INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATORS S229 
was no evidence that Cole or Anthony had ever been to the location 
before, nor did any physical evidence link Cole or Anthony to the 
crime. Shoeprints and fingerprints found at the scene matched neither 
Anthony nor Cole. Eyewitness descriptions of the attackers did not 
match the suspects, other than that the shooters were African 
American and so are Anthony and Cole. Security videotapes from 
the location, used by the pimp to monitor visitors to his girls, were 
seized by the police but lost before trial. An anonymous suspect was 
brought to the station that night, but there are no police records of 
who it was and the suspect was evidently released. The only possible 
eyewitnesses to the crime were two children, the pimp’s young 
daughters, who lived at their father’s “business” establishment. 
Seven and nine years old at the time, they were looking out the 
window at the time of the shooting and ran to tell their parents what 
had happened. Seeking to shield them from having to testify, their 
father, John Jones, designated himself an “eyewitness” to the crime 
and became the star witness for the prosecution at trial. As one might 
expect, Jones’s own background was less than sterling. He had a 
lengthy record of drug, gun, and vice violations. He was also 
convicted of fatally shooting
 
Cole, including its supporting exhibits, as well as the court record from the trial. 
 his girlfriend while she held her baby. 
  According to that record, on March 27, 1994, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Felipe 
Gonzales, Victor Trejo, and Luis Jimenez drove to a building at the corner of Figueroa and 49th 
Streets in Los Angeles so that Gonzales could see his “friend,” a female named either Melinda or 
Melissa. John Jones managed the building on the corner and rented rooms for $10 a day to 
prostitutes and transients. There, Gonzales got out of the car while Trejo and Jimenez stayed 
inside to clean up a beer Gonzales had spilled. Trejo then turned the car around and pulled up 
alongside Gonzales, who was chatting with someone in front of the building. 
  As Gonzales walked toward the car, three African American males surrounded him. One 
of the men grabbed Gonzales by the neck, pushed him up against Trejo’s car and hit him in the 
face with a gun. One of the other men yelled, “Stop the fucking car,” opened the passenger door, 
and said to Trejo and Jimenez, “Give me the money.” He had a silver automatic gun tucked in his 
pants. As he grabbed Jimenez by the hair, Trejo claimed to have seen his face, although the man 
did not even partially enter the car. Trejo grabbed the man’s hand, telling him there would not be 
a problem. The man then shot both Trejo and Jimenez numerous times, and Trejo drove off. As 
he was driving away, Trejo saw Gonzales being pushed and trying to run, then he heard more 
shots but did not see anything further. 
  When the paramedics arrived at the crime scene, they found Gonzales lying in the street 
on his stomach. They pronounced him dead on arrival at 11:41 p.m. The medical examiner 
testified that Gonzales died of a through-and-through gunshot wound to the back. 
  When Detective Marcella Winn arrived at the scene at about 1:30 a.m., she found no 
witnesses. At 4:00 a.m., as she was standing on the corner of 49th and Figueroa, John Jones 
leaned out a second-floor window, said, “Pssst, officer, they ran that-a-way,” and pointed 
eastward on 49th Street. After a few requests, Jones came downstairs and spoke with Winn for 
about five minutes. No other witnesses came forward. 
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But he was on excellent terms with the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) officers because, among other things, he 
allegedly made his employees’ services available to officers who 
wished to use them. 
On the night of the murder, Detective Marcella Winn responded 
to the scene after midnight, accompanied by her partner, veteran 
Detective Pete “Raz” Razankas. It was Winn’s first investigation, 
and she had a journalist and book author, Miles Corwin, tagging 
along to chronicle her investigation. Corwin was planning to write a 
book about the carnage on the streets of Los Angeles and the great 
work of LAPD homicide detectives. Ultimately, Corwin did write 
that book, The Killing Season, and it begins as follows: 
 Homicide detectives in South-Central Los Angeles 
usually do not wait long for a murder. On Detective 
Marcella Winn’s first weekend on call, she spends an edgy 
Friday evening at home, waiting for the call of death. She 
watches a video of the movie Tombstone and munches on 
popcorn, but cannot keep her mind on the plot. She keeps 
waiting for the phone to ring. Before going to sleep, she 
lays out her gold linen blazer, beige blouse and green rayon 
slacks; she does not want to have to fumble through her 
closet in the middle of the night looking for the right color 
combination. Winn has been in the homicide bureau only 
two weeks and this will be her first murder investigation.7 
Winn and her partner became the book’s stars as Corwin spent 
scores of pages regaling the reader with the step-by-step account of 
how they had solved the murder. He recalled how the case went cold 
early because the police had no suspects on the night of the shooting
 
 7. MILES CORWIN, THE KILLING SEASON 25 (1st ed. 1997). 
. 
Corwin then shared how he regularly checked in with Winn, but she 
had reported that she was having no luck finding the shooters. Then, 
Winn’s luck turned one month after the murder when she allegedly 
received an anonymous call8 that “Baby Day from Five Deuce 
Avalon Crips made a move on 49th Street9 with two guys, and it 
 8. There is neither a record of this call in the police logs nor any recording of it, although 
Winn listed it in her reports. Defense counsel suspected that Winn herself may have been the 
source of this call. 
 9. If Winn had checked, she would have learned that no such gang ever existed in Los 
Angeles. See STEVEN R. CURETON, HOOVER CRIPS: WHEN CRIPIN’ BECOMES A WAY OF LIFE 7 
(2008). 
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went wrong.” Winn pulled the gang files for a “Baby Day” and 
found that fourteen individuals were registered as having a similar 
gang moniker. In particular, “Baby Day Day” belonged to an 
associate of Obie Anthony, Michael Miller, and Obie Anthony had 
the moniker of “Little Day Day.” When Winn learned that Michael 
Miller, Obie Anthony, and Obie’s friend Reggie Cole had recently 
been arrested for a carjacking and robbery, she believed that she had 
the right suspects for the Gonzales killing and started to build the 
case against them. 
There were early signs that Winn might have been on the wrong 
track, but she ignored them. For example, the carjacking case against 
Anthony and Cole was dismissed when the police determined that 
the carjacking had never occurred. Also, “Baby Day” and “Little Day 
Day” are two distinctively different gang monikers. 10 Finally, when 
asked to identify Anthony and Cole in live lineups and from 
photospreads, none of Gonzales’s companions could do so. 
Yet, Winn continued to build her case; to do so, she turned to 
the so-called eyewitness, John Jones, the pimp at the whorehouse. 
On the night of the murder when Jones was interviewed, he said that 
he had heard a commotion outside of his place and that his young 
daughters had come running to his wife about the disturbance. Later 
during the investigation, Jones told Winn that he would be the 
“eyewitness” because he wanted to keep the young girls out of it. 
Jones also told Winn that he could identify at least one of the 
shooters because when the shooting
 
 10. Importantly, as an expert in the post-conviction proceedings eventually testified, “Baby 
Day Day” and “Little Day Day” are not the same moniker. In fact, they are different generations 
of gang members. “Little Day Day” would be senior to “Baby Day Day,” making “Baby Day 
Day” the protégé of “Little Day Day.” See Declaration of Alex Alonso, Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus, Exhibit 7. 
 began, a so-called good citizen 
(i.e., Jones), started to shoot at the fleeing suspects as they ran away 
from the building. 11 The good citizen, who had been a sharpshooter 
 11. Jones’s remarks to the police were reported in THE KILLING SEASON as follows: 
[John Jones] studies his rings and says softly, “You should look into whether one of the 
suspects got shot.” 
  “Why?” Razanskas asks. 
  “Just a hunch.” 
  Razanskas and Winn look puzzled. Then they suddenly realize that the shots from 
the third gun on the tape were not fired by the suspects, but were fired at the 
suspects. . . . 
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in the military, hit one of the suspects in the leg. 12 If Winn could 
catch a guy with a bullet wound, Jones could identify him as the 
shooter. 
Winn returned to Jones and told him that they had caught the 
shooters. 13 She told him that Cole had a bullet wound in his leg and 
that Anthony went by the name “Baby Day Day,” the same name the 
anonymous caller had used to name the suspects. 14 She failed to 
mention that Cole’s bullet wound was eight years old, not four weeks 
old, and that Anthony’s moniker was “Little Day Day,” not “Baby 
Day.” 15 Winn told Jones that both suspects were black and members 
of a gang. 16 She also said that they had committed carjackings in the 
area. 17 She then asked Jones to identify the suspects from 
photospreads. 18 Although he had never seen the suspects’ faces, 
Jones identified Cole and Anthony from the photospreads. 19 Later, in 
 
  “You know,” Razanskas tells Jones, “we have no problem with this guy firing a 
few shots.” 
  “What if he’s an ex-felon with a gun?” Jones asks. 
  “We still have no problem.” Razanskas leans forward and says earnestly, “I’m 
going to be up front with you. I look at this guy as a fucking hero I’d like to give him a 
medal. Let’s just call him an ‘unknown citizen’ We’ll leave it at that.” 
  Jones stares into his coffee cup. He tells Razanskas he trusts him. He knows the 
hooker Razanskas talked to the night of the murder. He talked to her yesterday, and she 
told him, “Raz is straight.” 
  “All right,” Jones says. “The unknown citizen,” he says, smiling amused at the 
phrase, “capped off six rounds.” 
  The unknown citizen fired the shots as the suspects ran down the street toward the 
alley, Jones says. One shot hit the suspect wearing the long coat in the leg. . . . 
. . . . 
  Winn and Razanskas do not want to push too hard to determine who the unknown 
citizen was. They have a good witness, a rare commodity these days in South Bureau 
Homicide. They do not want to do anything to scare him off. 
CORWIN, supra note 7, at 41–42. 
 12. Jones claimed to have been a sharpshooter when he was in the Army. Id. 
 13. Id. at 45. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. Winn used nearly every technique likely to lead to unreliable identifications. See 
generally Robert A. Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a 
Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435 (2009) (identifying several reasons why eyewitness 
testimony can be unreliable: (a) the nature of human memory, (b) eyewitness bias, (c) 
misinformation effect, (d) source monitoring errors, (e) hindsight bias, (f) eyewitness 
overconfidence in the accuracy of his or her perceptions and memory and the malleability of 
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the post-conviction litigation, Jones said he had made those 
identifications because Winn tapped on the photographs of the 
people she wanted him to identify. 
As can easily happen, once Winn was convinced that she had the 
right suspects, she set about making sure that the evidence at trial 
matched her theory. Witnesses who could make no identifications the 
night of the murder were told that the police had caught “the right 
guys” and that it would be helpful if the witnesses would come to 
court for trial. At trial, Victor Trejos, who had been with Gonzales 
that night, identified Cole and Anthony. 20 He had previously stated 
that he could not identify the attackers and had actually picked a 
different individual at an earlier identification. Yet, after his 
conversation with Winn, he testified at the preliminary hearing that 
he saw Anthony’s face in a dream and was sure that he was one of 
the attackers. Another one of Gonzales’s companions, Luis Jiminez, 
was not subpoenaed for trial. In the post-conviction investigation, 
Luis described the attackers as much taller and older than Cole and 
Anthony. 
Winn’s investigative techniques and the exonerating witnesses’ 
statements were not revealed at the time of trial. Cole and Anthony 
were convicted on Jones’s and Trejos’s testimony. Winn was 
championed for her work on the case. Corwin published an article in 
the Los Angeles Times titled Murder on 49th Street: Felipe Gonzales 
Angeles’ Shooting
 
eyewitness confidence, and (g) actions by officers to draw the eyewitness’s attention to the 
suspect). Nearly every factor that is likely to lead to an unreliable eyewitness investigation 
applied to Jones’s situation. First, Jones had his own bias. He was strongly motivated to assist the 
LAPD because he knew his own operations were in jeopardy if he did not assist them. One phone 
call could shut down his operations. Moreover, there was some possibility that he had actually 
shot the victim, Gonzales, as he shot randomly at suspects running from the scene. Second, Jones 
was given erroneous information about the apprehended suspects’ backgrounds. Third, Jones was 
told that he had identified the correct suspects. Fourth, Winn used means—such as the tap on the 
defendants’ photos—to draw Jones’s attention to the suspects. Since Jones did not reveal these 
problems in the identification procedures until the habeas investigation, the defendant was unable 
to use it in the cross-examination of Jones at trial. 
 Was Typical of Most of the 836 Homicides in Los 
Angeles Last Year: No Press Coverage, Few Leads, the Victim 
Quickly Forgotten. What It Did Have Was a Couple of Cops Driven 
to Find His Killer 21 and ended The Killing Season with the following 
 20. Interestingly, in all of their statements, neither Jones nor Trejo ever recalled that the 
assailants had any distinctive marks on their faces. However, Obie Anthony has a large tear-drop 
scar on his eye as the result of having been hit by a car three years earlier. 
 21. Miles Corwin, Murder on 49th Street: Felipe Gonzales Angeles’ Shooting Was Typical 
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statement: “Obie Anthony and Reggie Cole, the two suspects in 
Winn’s first homicide case, were both convicted of first-degree 
murder. They were sentenced to life imprisonment without parole 
(LWOP), which the detectives call El-Wop.” 22 
It was not until twelve years later, when Cole faced additional 
charges for his conduct in prison, and another judge started looking 
into the case, that the defense discovered how Winn had put together 
the original case. Defense investigators reinterviewed witnesses, 
pulled Cole’s medical records for the old gunshot injury, and 
conducted additional searches for information regarding Jones, the 
prosecution’s key witness. 23 In talking with Jones, the defense 
investigators learned that Winn had never told Jones that Cole’s 
bullet wound was an old injury. 24 Had she done so, Jones said he 
would never have identified Cole or Anthony at trial. 25 
Based on these new revelations, Cole petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 26 His petition was granted and his case dismissed. 27 
The court held that it was ineffective assistance of counsel for Cole’s 
lawyer not to introduce the records of Cole’s prior gunshot injury. 28 
Even after the dismissal, Winn’s personal investment was apparent: 
“‘This guy did this murder, and there’s no doubt in my mind and in 
other witnesses’ minds,’ she said. ‘Mr. Cole is not innocent.’” 29 
Obie Anthony, however, stays in jail. His evidentiary hearing is 
pending. 30 His conviction was also based on Jones’s testimony, but, 
unlike his co-defendant, Anthony lacks the record of an old gunshot 
 
of Most of the 836 Homicides in Los Angeles Last Year: No Press Coverage, Few Leads, the 
Victim Quickly Forgotten. What It Did Have Was a Couple of Cops Driven to Find His Killer, 
L.A. TIMES MAG., Mar. 26, 1995, at 22. 
 22. CORWIN, supra note 7, at 327. 
 23. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 12, Cole v. Smalls (2008) (No. BA097736). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exhibit 3, Declaration of John Henry Jones, In re 
Obie Steven Anthony III (2010). 
 26. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 12, Cole v. Smalls (2008) (No. BA097736). 
 27. Order Vacating Judgment, Cole v. Smalls (2010) (No. BA097736). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Hector Becerra, After 14 Years, Charges Dismissed Against Man Convicted of Murder, 
L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2009, at A4. 
 30. As with federal habeas corpus claims, state judges traditionally have broad discretion to 
decide whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2); see also United 
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219–20 (1952) (discussing prisoners’ rights in habeas corpus 
hearings). The petitioner bears the burden of proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence in an 
evidentiary hearing. In re Visciotti, 926 P2d 987, 1002–03 (Cal. 1996). 
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injury that might automatically exonerate him. In order to exonerate 
Anthony, his counsel 31 will have to do what most habeas petitioners 
must do—demonstrate by a complete reinvestigation of the case why 
he was wrongfully convicted. 
In his habeas petition, Anthony reveals additional evidence 
obtained in a post-conviction investigation. For example, the 
petition’s exhibits show that Jones had a prior conviction for 
shooting
These Brady violations 35 lie at the heart of Anthony’s habeas 
petition and rest on a key declaration signed by Jones. However, 
equally important is recently discovered information that Winn used 
improper identification techniques when getting Jones to identify 
Cole and Anthony as the shooters in their murder case. According to 
a declaration signed by Jones during the defense’s post-conviction 
investigation, had he known that Cole’s injury was an old one—and 
not caused by the “good citizen’s” shot—and had Winn never tapped 
on the photospreads during the identification procedures, he would 
never have identified Anthony or Cole as the shooters. 36 In other 
 his girlfriend in the head as she held her baby. 32 He 
received only a year in jail on a manslaughter charge for that 
killing. 33 More importantly, notes in the prosecutor’s files of John 
Jones’s pandering and prostitution cases indicate that the police and 
prosecution were repaying his cooperation in Anthony’s case by 
arguing leniency for Jones. 34 These notes were never revealed to the 
defense during the original murder trial. 
 
 31. The Northern California Innocence Project represents Obie Anthony, assisted by 
students in Loyola Law School Los Angeles’s Project for the Innocent and supervised by this 
Author. The Loyola Project for the Innocent is a clinic within the Loyola Law School Los 
Angeles Alarcón Advocacy Center. 
 32. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exhibit 17, New Documents from District Attorney 
re: Favorable Treatment of John Jones, In re Obie Steven Anthony III (2010). 
 33. Probation Officer’s Report, People v. Jones, No. A-380176, 1-366939 (Apr. 25, 1983). 
 34. The officers and prosecutors were obligated to share this information with the defense. 
See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“The staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s 
office have the burden of ‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done”). 
 35. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady violation consists of three elements. 
First, the evidence at issue must be favorable to the defendant, either because it is impeaching or 
because it is exculpatory. Second, the State must have suppressed the evidence, either willfully or 
unintentionally. Finally, the failure to disclose the evidence must have resulted in prejudice. 
 36. If believed by the court, Jones’s declaration would form the basis for a due process 
challenge to Anthony’s conviction. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (“More than 30 years ago 
this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction 
obtained by the knowing use of false evidence. There has been no deviation from this established 
principle.”). “A defendant has a due process right to a fair trial. Government agents may not 
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words, Jones not only retracted his trial testimony but also accused 
Winn of using improper procedures to obtain eyewitness 
identifications. 
In preparation for filing its response, the prosecution decided to 
conduct its own investigation. Instead of using an independent 
investigator, prosecutors asked Winn to do the follow-up. Winn was 
then sent on a mission to investigate her own alleged misconduct. 
Apparently, Winn’s first stop in conducting her post-conviction 
investigation was to talk to Jones again. She can be heard on an 
audiotape of that interview prodding Jones to recant his recantation. 
She offered Jones other “valid” reasons he selected Anthony and 
suggested that he be more confident in his original identifications. 
She further asked Jones to confirm that she never did anything to 
influence his testimony, including affirming that his parole status 
was not a factor in deciding to help the detectives in their case 
against Anthony and Cole. 
Post-conviction investigations like Winn’s put prosecutors in a 
very difficult situation. Because Winn is invested in validating her 
original investigative work, the prosecutors are in the unenviable 
position of assessing the defendant’s post-conviction claims by 
relying on information from a biased investigator. Politically, it is 
difficult for the prosecution to attack its star investigator—who has 
built her career on this highly visible case—and who now supervises 
a team of detectives who handle the prosecutors’ homicide cases. 37 
Additionally, the prosecutors would have the practical problem of 
finding resources to fund an independent investigator to reinvestigate 
 
manufacture evidence and offer it against a criminal defendant.” Doswell v. City of Pittsburgh, 
No. 07-0761, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51435,at *24 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2009) (quoting Stepp v. 
Mangold, No. 94-2108, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8633, 1998 WL 309921, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 
1998)). Under California law, like that of many other jurisdictions, a claim of perjured testimony 
or a claim of the prosecution presenting false evidence must show that the falsity was not 
apparent to the trier of fact from the trial record and that the defendant had no opportunity at trial 
to show the evidence was false (usually because the prosecution suppressed evidence). In re 
Waltreus, 397 P.2d 1001, 1002–03 (Cal. 1965). 
 37. Few prosecutors take the step of notifying their superiors, let alone the court, that indeed 
they may be facing a situation of tainted police work. Cf. Melanie D. Wilson, Finding a Happy 
and Ethical Medium Between a Prosecutor Who Believes the Defendant Didn’t Do It and the 
Boss Who Says That He Did, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 65 (2008), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/30/LRColl2008n30Wilson.pdf 
(recommending that prosecutors alert courts to their doubts about cases that their supervisors 
insist they pursue). 
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the case. 38 
As this case demonstrates, the conflicts of interest borne by 
investigators may severely compromise the search for justice. 
Without an independent investigation, it will be difficult to convince 
prosecutors that their nationally touted detective was responsible for 
wrongful convictions in a celebrated murder case. While the court 
may eventually make that finding, the prosecution will continue to 
present to the court tainted testimony in the post-conviction 
proceedings. 
B.  The Bigger Picture 
Although the case of People v. Cole & Anthony gives a helpful 
close-up of the problems inherent in using investigators with 
conflicts, this problem is more widespread. The number of 
wrongfully convicted defendants in America is alarming. According 
to an early study by the director of the Criminal Justice Research 
Center and the School of Public Policy and Management at Ohio 
State University, close to 10,000 people in the United States may be 
wrongfully convicted of serious crimes every year. 39 But that is just 
an estimate based on studies of other wrongful convictions. 
We know for sure that DNA testing has exonerated over 280 
defendants, 77 percent of whom had convictions based on eyewitness 
identifications. 40 Many of those also included allegations of law 
enforcement misconduct in obtaining the identifications, including 
 
 38. However, to their credit, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, Appellate 
Section, has recently agreed to relieve Winn of her investigative responsibilities and use 
investigators from the District Attorney’s Office to do the follow-up investigation. Memorandum 
(on file with author). 
 39. See C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION 
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996). 
 40. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 62 (2008) 
(studying a few known innocence cases as a microcosm of larger issues); Samuel R. Gross, 
Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 174–76 (2008) (discussing the far-
reaching effects of some recent exonerations); Samuel R. Gross, et al., Exonerations in the United 
States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005) (discussing some 
“basic patterns” that have led to false convictions); Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming 
Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595 
(2009) (suggesting procedures to reform witness identification); Sandra Guerra Thompson, 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification 
Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487 (2008) (arguing that reform to remedy witness 
misidentification aimed solely at police procedures is insufficient and effective reform requires 
corroborated evidence). 
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some of the methods allegedly used by Winn. 41 
There is a compelling interest in having post-conviction 
investigations that will ferret out misidentifications and investigator 
misconduct. Unlike the inquisitorial system, used in European 
countries, where the court directly supervises a case’s investigation 
and post-conviction review is readily available, 42 the American 
model takes a very limited approach to affording post-conviction 
relief. The integrity of the evidence presented to the court depends in 
large part on the integrity of the prosecutors and police in the 
adversarial process. The need for independent investigators is 
heightened by the fact that most habeas petitions are handled pro se 
by petitioners unschooled in the law and without resources to 
conduct any investigation while they remain in custody. 43 At most, 
they can bring some simple facts to the court and hope that the court 
will grant an evidentiary hearing or appoint an investigator to assist 
with the habeas petition. 44 
In her article An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 45 Professor 
Melanie D. Wilson notes that 
[i]f the police honestly, but incorrectly, believe X 
committed the crime, they will not look for Y, the real 
 
 41. See supra note 19. 
 42. See generally Paul J. Saguil, Improving Wrongful Conviction Review: Lessons from a 
Comparative Analysis of Continental Criminal Procedure, 45 ALBERTA L. REV. 117 (2007). For 
example, France allows post-conviction review whenever there is a showing of new facts or 
evidence that the defendant was convicted on false testimony. Id. at 125. A commission of five 
judges sits as a sort of examining magistrate to review and call for further investigation. Id. at 
124. The French courts are not bound by technical or inflexible rules of evidence and its duty is 
“to search for the objective truth and not merely admissible evidence.” Id. at 125. Other countries 
have adopted different models to investigate allegations of miscarriages of justice, including 
independent commissions that review and investigate such claims. See Criminal Cases Review 
Commission, http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/ (last visited June 11, 2011). 
 43. See Anna R. Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 68 MD L. REV. 545, 597 (2009). 
 44. Petitioners are also hampered by the fact that most jurisdictions do not afford the right to 
post-conviction motions for police files that may disclose other acts of misconduct by the 
investigating officers. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1043 (2011) (stating that Pitchess motions to 
discover police agency record concerning an officer must be filed pretrial); Pitchess v. Superior 
Court, 522 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1974) (holding that defendant was entitled to discover prior citizen 
complaints against officers alleging misconduct). Post-conviction discovery is limited to capital 
cases. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.9; People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1203 (Cal. 1990) 
(holding that trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for postjudgment discovery after 
the judgment has become final). 
 45. See Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 
(2010). 
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culprit. In addition, they will become myopic in analyzing 
evidence and interviewing witnesses, viewing every detail 
they uncover from the perspective of an officer who 
believes that he [or she] knows “who did it.” 46 
Just as troubling, “[i]f police lie about the evidence and the 
validity of the case—especially if they tell the lies because of their 
own belief in the defendant’s guilt—then prosecutors may become 
entrenched in the police’s beliefs that the defendant did it.” 47 Once 
there has been a conviction, it is extremely difficult to convince 
prosecutors and officers that the convicted person is actually 
innocent. 48 The officers are far too invested in the case, and their role 
in it, to capitulate to new challenges by the defendant. 49 
In recent years, there has been growing attention to the problem 
of having law enforcement officers investigate their own alleged 
misconduct. 50 Celebrated police scandals, such as the Rodney King 
beating incident 51 and the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles, 52 have 
demonstrated the dangers of having police departments that are 
 
 46. Id. at 17. 
 47. Id. at 18. 
 48. For example, after the Cole dismissal, Winn affirmatively stated that “[i]t was a good 
case 13, 14 years ago, and it’s a good case now.” Becerra, supra note 29. 
 49. There are fewer options in the post-conviction scenario for remedying police lies or 
misconduct. First, the misconduct and lies are less likely to be revealed because there is no 
guarantee of a hearing on the matter where the petitioner will have an opportunity to cross-
examine the investigating officer. Second, proposals to use incentives such as the exclusionary 
rule will not work at that stage. The case has already been tried and a jury has already heard the 
tainted evidence. 
 50. See generally Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 15, 22–24 (2001) (arguing that addressing police misconduct requires a 
multi-faceted approach that involves both public and political powers). 
 51. See Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Cases: The 
Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 509, 516–33 (1994). 
 52. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The Rampart Scandal: Policing the Criminal 
Justice System: An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of 
Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 545, 553–75 (2001) (describing 
causes and responses to scandal in which LAPD gang officers framed and shot innocent suspects 
and detailing dangers that occur when police are allowed to investigate alleged misconduct 
against their own officers); Levenson, supra note 50, at 37–39 (advocating for independent 
investigators in prosecution offices to investigate claims of police misconduct); see also Carol 
Chase, Rampart: A Crying Need to Restore Police Accountability, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 767, 
774–75 (2001) (stating that restoring police accountability requires implementing rules that 
permit direct punishment for officers who violate the law); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Police Abuse: 
Outsiders May Be the Best Judges, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, at M1 (arguing that reform with 
respect to police misconduct requires police and prosecutors at all ranks to recognize that the 
release of relevant but negative information will help to further justice rather than to subvert 
crime fighting). 
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allowed to decide for themselves whether there has been improper 
police conduct. At least in dealing with police abuse cases there has 
been a positive move toward using independent investigators and 
prosecutorial units to investigate and prosecute such cases. Experts 
have recognized that it is just too difficult for prosecutors and 
officers to question and undermine the work of those they depend on 
with their daily work. 53 
We are at the point where we should come to a similar 
conclusion with regard to post-conviction investigations in habeas 
corpus cases. If the allegations in a habeas petition are that an officer 
misled witnesses into providing identifications or engaged in other 
misconduct then that officer should be recused from conducting the 
post-conviction investigation. 54 
III.  SEARCHING FOR CONFLICT RULES FOR INVESTIGATORS 
Currently, no court rules or ethical codes govern the assignment 
of investigators to post-conviction cases. Out of habit, prosecutors 
routinely use the same agent who originally investigated the criminal 
charge, even when the post-conviction allegations involve claims of 
police misconduct and misleading identification procedures. 55 
Prosecutors turn to the original investigating officers because they 
are the ones most familiar with the cases and have the most at stake 
should the convictions be overturned. Strapped for resources, 
prosecutors can avoid the considerable start-up costs of assigning a 
new officer by reassigning the original officer on the case. 
The problem with this approach is that it ignores basic conflict-
of-interest principles. It is impossible for an investigating agent to 
investigate his or her own alleged misconduct. One cannot 
 
 53. “Given the important and pervasive role of police departments, the value of independent 
internal investigations with respect to police functions enhances public confidence in this 
significant public service. Therefore, in order to preserve both credibility and legitimacy, internal 
investigations into police conduct must be independent of the police themselves . . . .” William K. 
Slate II, Institutional Fact-Finding? Getting Started—Where to Go?, 16 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 
18 (Jan. 2008) (quoting Eileen Luna & Samuel Walker, IX. Alternative Models of Police 
Oversight, in A REPORT ON THE OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS OF THE ALBUQUERQUE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (1997), available at http://www.cabq.gov/council/abqrpt9.html). 
 54. At this point, the original investigating officer is likely to be a witness in future 
evidentiary hearings and, for that reason as well, it is better that another officer investigate the 
allegations of misconduct. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 3.7 (2002) (discussing 
lawyers as witnesses). 
 55. Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction 
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 494 (2009). 
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realistically expect an officer to step back after a successful 
prosecution and admit the flaws she made in the case. The officer’s 
personal investment in the outcome of the case will inevitably 
interfere with the constitutional duty to exonerate the innocent. 
Unlike prosecutors and defense lawyers, law enforcement 
officers are not subject to specific conflict-of-interest rules that 
govern whether they can be assigned to a specific investigation. 
Rather, they are assigned as their superiors and prosecutors see fit 
based upon their own evaluations of interests in the case. 56 While 
some prosecutors are quick to spot the conflict arising from having 
law enforcement officers conduct post-conviction investigations of 
their own cases, other prosecutors are not. Many have a natural 
instinct to dispatch the original investigating officer to determine if a 
recanting witness should now be believed or whether mistakes were 
made in the original investigation. This is true even when the 
recanting witness claims to have been misled or intimidated by the 
original investigating officer. 
It has long been recognized that a lawyer cannot serve two 
masters. 57 By definition, conflicts of interest are “some particular 
incentive that threatens to impair an attorney’s functioning.” 58 The 
incentive may be to help another client or to help the lawyer herself. 
However, the competing interest impairs the lawyer’s ability to be a 
zealous advocate for the client. 
Conflict-of-interest principles for government lawyers, 
especially prosecutors, are different. Because a prosecutor represents 
the community-at-large, not one individual such as the victim or 
investigating agent, the prosecutor must at all times focus on 
securing an honest and just outcome to a case. A prosecutor’s official 
duties require safeguarding the defendant’s constitutional rights. As 
set forth in the latest draft of the ABA Standards for Criminal 
 
 56. While governing rules would be helpful, this is but one of many situations in which 
prosecutors must make decisions that are not directly governed by procedural or ethical standards. 
In fact, some of the most important decisions prosecutors make are not directly governed by 
rules. See Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of 
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553 (1999). 
 57. Beth Nolan, Regulating Government Ethics: When It’s Not Enough to Just Say No, 58 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 405, 414 (1990). 
 58. Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 823, 831 (1992). For an excellent article on the history and operation of conflict of 
interest rules, see Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 541 (1997). 
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Justice, 
The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an advocate, 
an officer of the court . . . . The primary duty of the 
prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law. 
The prosecutor’s client is the public . . . . The prosecutor 
serves the public interest and must act to protect the 
innocent, convict the guilty, and consider the interests of 
the victims. 59 
But a prosecutor does not work alone. Prosecutors must rely on 
their law enforcement investigators to secure the evidence in their 
cases. Ultimately, prosecutors are responsible for the actions of those 
investigators, but the investigator’s ethical duties, including 
prohibitions against conflicts of interest, are not covered by 
prosecutorial codes of ethics. 60 They are left to the law enforcement 
departments’ integrity and administration. 
A.  The Gaping Hole in Conflict-of-Interest Codes for Investigators 
No national code governs conflict-of-interest standards for law 
enforcement officials. Each law enforcement agency is free to adopt 
standards governing its officers’ actions, so long as those standards 
comply with other requirements for public servants in that 
jurisdiction. Thus, for example, the LAPD’s policies on conflicts of 
interest fall within the purview of the Los Angeles City Ethics 
Commission, which sets forth general prohibitions on conflicts of 
interest. As is typical for most jurisdictions, these conflict-of-interest 
regulations focus solely on financial conflicts of interests, 61 with no 
guidance as to dealing with conflicts of interest that may arise when 
an officer is asked to investigate his or her own behavior. 
For the last two decades, periodic articles written by law 
 
 59. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(a)–(b) (Draft 2010). 
 60. At most, the ethical codes make clear that the prosecutor “should strive to keep law 
enforcement personnel informed of relevant legal and ethical issues” and that prosecutors should 
use “independent judgment when interacting with law enforcement personnel.” STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 3-3.2(a)–(b) (3d 
ed. 1993) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE]. 
 61. See L.A. CITY ETHICS COMM’N, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST CODE (2001), available at http http://ethics.lacity.org/PDF/COI_Web/LAPD_COI.pdf . 
Although the conflict-of-interest provisions of the code dedicate fourteen pages to prohibited 
financial relationships, there is not one word regarding an officer’s personal conflict with an 
investigation. 
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enforcement officials have called for greater guidance on a wider 
range of ethical issues. In 1993, FBI Special Agent Dennis M. Payne 
proposed that police managers be more aggressive in their efforts to 
develop ethical codes for their departments. Without identifying 
what these codes should state, Payne noted that “[i]nstitutionalizing 
ethics . . . means integrating ethics into daily decisionmaking and 
work practices.” 62 Police regulations must cover a wide range of 
police behavior to effectively guide officers’ most important 
decisions. 
Most departments, however, did not adopt far-reaching ethical 
codes. Fearing that such codes would lead to increased 
administrative sanctions of officers, law enforcement departments set 
additional aspirational goals for their officers. 63 Yet, even these 
aspirational codes do not alert officers to the personal conflicts they 
may have in conducting post-conviction investigations. Rather, they 
encourage officers to use their “moral compasses” in ensuring that 
they are engaged in acceptable behavior. 64 
Law enforcement ethical codes typically opt for “vague 
guidelines [to] provide flexibility for individual interpretations and 
for unique circumstances.” 65 Even the Model Policy on Standards of 
 
 62. Dennis M. Payne, Ethics in Police Decisionmaking, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Aug. 
1993). 
 63. John R. Schafer, Making Ethical Decisions: A Practical Model, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT 
BULL. 14 (May 2002), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-
enforcement-bulletin/2002-pdfs/may02.pdf. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (quoting Todd S. Smith et al., Clinical Ethical Decision Making: An Investigation of 
the Rationales Used to Justify Doing Less Than One Believes One Should, 22 PROF. PSYCHOL.: 
RES. & PRAC. 235 (June 1991)); Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, The Evolution of the Law 
Enforcement Code of Ethics, 59 POLICE CHIEF 14 (Jan. 1992). In fact, the Internet teems with 
individual “Law Enforcement Codes of Ethics” written to inspire, not bind, police officers. For 
example, one such Code provides: 
  As a Law Enforcement Officer, my fundamental duty is to serve mankind; to 
safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception, the weak 
against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence or disorder; and to 
respect the Constitutional rights of all men to liberty, equality and justice. 
  I will keep my private life unsullied as an example to all; maintain courageous calm 
in the face of danger, scorn, or ridicule; develop self-restraint; and be constantly 
mindful of the welfare of others. Honest in thought and deed in both my personal and 
official life, I will be exemplary in obeying the laws of the land and the regulations of 
my department. Whatever I see or hear of a confidential nature or that is confided in 
me in my official capacity will be kept ever secret unless revelation is necessary in the 
performance of my duty. 
  I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, animosities or 
friendships to influence my decisions. With no compromise for crime and the relentless 
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Conduct 66 drafted by the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police speaks in general terms of “obedience to laws” and avoiding 
“conduct unbecoming an officer,” 67 rather than specifically dictating 
that officers should not conduct investigations in cases where the 
defense alleges that the police have improperly influenced a witness. 
This is not because the code fails to touch on specific prohibitions on 
police conduct. At thirty pages, it covers a wide range of topics from 
prohibiting officers from using tobacco products on duty to 
prohibiting them from accepting unsolicited gifts. It specifies in 
detail the nature of statements officers may make to the public, of 
prohibited endorsements, of limits on political activities, and of rules 
respecting privacy. However, it does not provide one word on when 
an officer’s investigative responsibilities may constitute a conflict of 
interest. 68 
The lack of police regulations on officers’ investigatory 
authority may be due, in part, to the belief that prosecutors will help 
direct officers in their investigative duties. Given that prosecutors 
will ultimately be responsible for presenting the evidence in court, 
they must be alert to the conflicts that officers may have in their 
investigations. But like police codes, the ethical standards governing 
prosecutors also do not yet address the problem of post-conviction 
conflicts of interest for law enforcement officers. 69 
 
prosecution of criminals, I will enforce the law courteously and appropriately without 
fear of favor, malice or ill will, never employing unnecessary force or violence and 
never accepting gratuities. 
  I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith, and I accept it as a 
public trust to be held so long as I am true to the ethics of the public service. I will 
constantly strive to achieve these objectives and ideals, dedicating myself before God 
to my chosen profession . . . law enforcement. 
Officer Code of Ethics, L.A. CNTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, http://la-sheriff.org/divisions/leadership-
training-div/assets/ ethicsstatement.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011). 
 66. Model Policy on Standards of Conduct, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE (2010), 
http://www.theiacp.org/PoliceServices/ExecutiveServices/ProfessionalAssistance/Ethics/ModelP
olicyonStandardsofConduct/tabid/196/Default.aspx#ModelPolicy. 
 67. See id. 
 68. In fact, it is remarkable how even the main reforms proposed for law enforcement 
following the Rodney King and Rampart police scandals did not articulate conflict-of-interest 
rules to apply to officers in conducting post-conviction investigations of their own cases. See, 
e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the ‘New Paradigm’ of Police Accountability: 
A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2010). 
 69. Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 171, 178, 185 (2005).There is a recent proposal to add a new standard to the ABA 
Prosecution Standards. Proposed Standard 3-7.1 would provide: “The prosecutor should conduct 
a fair evaluation of post-trial motions, determine their merit, and respond accordingly. The 
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In creating ethical standards to apply to assigning post-
conviction investigations to investigators, prosecutors may turn to 
the rules governing their own conflicts of interests. 70 Since 
prosecutors have the ultimate responsibility of ensuring that 
defendants’ due process rights are respected, they also have the 
ultimate duty to ensure that the officers they use operate free from 
self-interest. If the goal is to ensure that only the justly convicted 
remain in prison, the first step must be to ensure that fair and 
objective post-conviction investigations are conducted. 
B.  Conflict-of-Interest Rules for Prosecutors 
Prosecutors are governed by a variety of ethical codes. Each 
state has its standards of conduct. Most are patterned on national 
model codes of conduct. In particular, the ABA Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility and ABA Standards Relating to the 
Administration of Criminal Justice have been particularly influential 
in the drafting of ethical standards for prosecutors. 71 To a lesser 
extent, one can look at the general conflict-of-interest rules 
 
prosecutor should not oppose motions that the prosecutor believes are correct, or solely for the 
purpose of preserving a conviction.” For further discussion, see Part IV, infra. 
 70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2002); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
supra note 60. While there are general federal regulations regarding financial conflicts of interest 
for executive officers, see 5 C.F.R. § 2635, there are no general conflict-of-interest rules for law 
enforcement officers. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE), charged with educating federal 
employees on their ethical duties, sets forth regulations governing financial conflicts of interest. 
There is no specific guidance on how to evaluate personal interests that conflict with a particular 
assignment, other than the following General Principles: 
  Public trust and the American people have a right to expect that all employees will 
place loyalty to the Constitution, laws, regulations, and ethical principles above private 
gain. Employees fulfill that trust by adhering to general principles of ethical conduct, 
as well as specific ethical standards. 
  EXECUTIVE ORDER 12674 issued by President George H.W. Bush in 1989, and 
modified in 1990 by EXECUTIVE ORDER 12731 sets forth 14 general principles that 
broadly define the obligations of public service. Underlying these 14 principles are two 
core concepts— 
•  employees shall not use public office for private gain, and 
•  employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any 
private organization or individual. 
  In addition, employees must strive to avoid any action that would create the 
appearance that they are violating the law or ethical standards. 
Exec. Order No. 11,222, 30 Fed. Reg. 6469 (May 8, 1965); Exec. Order No. 12,674, 54 Fed. Reg. 
15159 (Apr. 12, 1989) (modified by Exec. Order No. 12,731, 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 (1992), 
reprinted as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 202 (2006)). 
 71. John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 
47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 546–47 (1994). 
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governing officers of the executive branch (which includes federal 
investigators) for guidance. However, the conflict-of-interest 
regulations focus only on financial conflicts and familial 
relationships. 72 Otherwise, the regulations only set forth a general 
admonition against engaging in activities that “may raise a question 
regarding the employee’s impartiality.” 73 
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility is directed 
at lawyers and does not provide any specific guidance on conflict-of-
interest rules for investigators. At most, Comment [1] to Rule 3.8 
provides that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of 
justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries 
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of 
sufficient evidence.” 74 
There may be more hope under the newly proposed ABA 
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice. While 
these standards also focus on the prosecutors’, not the police 
officers’, ethical duties when there are conflicts of interest, 75 the 
 
 72. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.402, .502 (2010). 
 73. 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.501–503 (1997). 
 74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003). 
 75. Laurie L. Levenson, Conflicts over Conflicts: Challenges in Redrafting the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice on Conflicts of Interest, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 879 (2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1746848. The ABA Task Force has proposed the following 
revised standards. As listed below, the key changes are identified by italics. 
  A prosecutor should avoid conflicts of interest with respect to his or her official 
duties, unless an appropriate waiver is obtained. The prosecutor should know and 
abide by the ethical rules regarding conflicts of interest that apply in his or her 
jurisdiction. A prosecutor should make appropriate disclosures regarding conflicts of 
interest, to supervisors, courts, or defense counsel, when appropriate. When a conflict 
is apparent, the prosecutor should recuse or decline to go forward until a non-
conflicted prosecutor is in place. 
  A prosecutor should not represent a defendant in criminal proceedings in a 
jurisdiction where he or she is also employed as a prosecutor. 
  A prosecutor should not, except as law may otherwise expressly permit, participate 
in a matter in which the prosecutor personally and substantially participated while in 
private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless those prior interests were 
substantially parallel to the current prosecutorial interests and there is no conflict of 
interest, or unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, 
authorized to act in the prosecutor’s stead in the matter. 
  A prosecutor who has formerly represented a client should not use information 
obtained from that representation to the disadvantage of the former client unless the 
rules of attorney-client confidentiality do not apply or the information has become 
generally known. 
  A prosecutor should not, except as law may otherwise expressly permit, negotiate 
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proposed language at least recognizes that when a prosecutor’s own 
conduct is at issue, that prosecutor should ordinarily be recused from 
continuing with that case if the accusations are not frivolous. 
Presumably, the new language is being added in recognition that it is 
folly to expect that a person will objectively investigate and confess 
his or her own misconduct. 
C.  Judicial Input 
Similar to the paucity of language regarding law enforcement 
officers’ conflicts of interest in ethical codes, very few judicial 
decisions deal with that issue. Some courts seem to assume that 
prosecutors will not use an investigator whose conduct has been 
challenged. For example, in People v. Merritt, 76 the defendant 
 
for private employment with any person who is involved as an accused or as an 
attorney or agent for an accused in a matter in which the prosecutor is participating 
personally and substantially. 
  A prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor’s professional judgment or 
obligations to be affected by the prosecutor’s personal, political, financial, business, 
property, or other interests or relationships. A prosecutor should disclose to 
appropriate supervisory personnel any such interests that could reasonably be viewed 
as raising a potential conflict of interest. If it is determined that the prosecutor should 
nevertheless continue to act in the matter, the prosecutor and supervisors should 
consider whether any disclosures to outside persons should be made, and make such 
disclosures if appropriate. 
  A prosecutor whose current relationship to another lawyer is parent, child, sibling, 
spouse or intimate sexual partner should not participate in the prosecution of a person 
who the prosecutor knows is represented by the other lawyer. A prosecutor who has a 
significant personal or financial relationship with another lawyer should not participate 
in the prosecution of a person who the prosecutor knows is represented by the other 
lawyer, unless the relationship is disclosed to the prosecutor’s supervisor [and the 
person’s defense counsel] and supervisory approval is given, or unless there is no other 
prosecutor authorized to act in the prosecutor’s stead. 
  A prosecutor should not recommend the services of particular defense counsel to 
accused persons or witnesses unless requested by the accused person or witness to 
make such a recommendation, and should not make a referral that is likely to create a 
conflict of interest. A prosecutor should not comment upon the reputation or abilities 
of defense counsel to an accused person or witness who is seeking or may seek such 
counsel’s services unless requested by such person. 
  A prosecutor whose own conduct is the subject of an official investigation of a 
nonfrivolous allegation should ordinarily be recused from acting as prosecutor in the 
matter in which the challenged conduct originated. However, a mere allegation of 
misconduct is generally not a sufficient basis for such recusal, absent a judicial or 
supervisory evaluation that the allegation warrants serious review. Neither should an 
unfounded allegation of misconduct deter a prosecutor from fair pursuit of any matter. 
Nevertheless, a prosecutor should report to a supervisor any misconduct allegation 
made against him or her, in order to obtain a second opinion of its merits. 
 76. 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 (Ct. App. 1993). 
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claimed that the district attorney investigator had a conflict of 
interest because the investigator had suggested that one of the 
witnesses committed perjury and concealed facts. 77 The defendant 
moved to recuse the entire district attorney’s office. The court denied 
the motion to recuse the office but found that the investigator had 
engaged in inappropriate actions and obviously could not continue to 
work on the case. Once the investigator “was removed and totally 
insulated from all further decisions and investigation in respondent’s 
case,” there was no need for further action against the office. 78 
Nothing in the record demonstrated that the “district attorney’s office 
ha[d] any interest or motive other than to present evidence in a fair 
manner, or that the insulating of [the investigator] was based upon 
anything other than a desire to handle respondent’s case in the most 
proper way.” 79 Accordingly, while the investigator would be recused, 
the prosecutor did not need to be sanctioned for the investigator’s 
actions. 80 
Other courts simply focus on whether the facts of the case 
indicate that the prosecutor and his or her team has acted with 
“hostility” toward the defendant. 81 Yet, even with such hostility, the 
courts are not necessarily ready to grant habeas relief to a defendant. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether there is a general 
due process right to a conflict-free prosecutor, 82 although there is 
dictum in the Court’s decision in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. 83 
suggesting that a prosecutor’s personal interest in a case may raise 
serious constitutional issues. 84 Ultimately, the issue is whether the 
defendant can show prejudice from any bias that the prosecution 
team demonstrated against him. 85 
 
 77. Id. at 179. 
 78. Id. at 181. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 182. 
 81. Johnson v. Horel, No. C 07-4483, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125005 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 
2010). 
 82. See People v. Vasquez, 137 P.3d 199, 207 (Cal. 2006) (“Neither this court nor the United 
States Supreme Court has delineated the limitations due process places on prosecutorial conflicts 
of interest.”), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1214 (2007). 
 83. 446 U.S. 238 (1980). 
 84. Id. at 248–50. 
 85. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (holding that error is harmless and 
cannot support habeas relief unless it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining jury’s verdict); see also State ex rel. Hilbig v. McDonald, 877 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 
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For defendants seeking post-conviction relief, the requirement 
that the defendant show prejudice in order to obtain a neutral 
investigator for the post-conviction claims poses a catch-22 situation. 
In order to obtain a neutral investigator, the defendant must show 
that using the old investigator will taint the investigation. But the 
original investigator must be used to determine whether there has 
been prejudice. 
IV.  A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
There is a simple way to avoid travesties that may result from 
having a tainted investigator conduct a post-conviction investigation. 
Jurisdictions should adopt specific rules that disqualify a police 
officer from conducting a post-conviction investigation of a case in 
which the officer has a direct conflict of interest. As with the 
proposed rule for prosecutors, the disqualification provision would 
be triggered when a defendant raises a nonfrivolous allegation of 
misconduct against the investigating officer. 86 Thus, the proposed 
rule would provide: 
An investigating officer whose conduct is the subject of 
nonfrivolous allegations in a petition for post-conviction relief 
should be recused from acting as the investigator in the post-
conviction proceedings. It is the responsibility of the prosecutor to 
ensure that an investigator charged with misconduct not participate 
in the investigation of his or her own alleged misconduct. 
The types of allegations that would trigger the recusal rule 
would include a prima facie showing that the investigator had 
tampered with eyewitness identifications or had failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor and the court, regardless of 
whether the defendant has demonstrated prejudice from this conduct. 
Only by using an independent investigator can it actually be 
determined what, if any, prejudice was caused by the original 
investigator’s misconduct. 87 
 
App. 1994) (holding that mere allegations of unethical conduct or evidence showing a remote 
possibility of a violation of the disciplinary rules do not suffice). 
 86. Ultimately, the court would have to decide what constitutes a “nonfrivolous” allegation 
of misconduct. A mere allegation that an investigator is too committed to a case would be 
insufficient. Rather, there must be evidence that the officer made a specific error during an 
investigation and that the error likely prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. 
 87. The standard for prejudice is the same as that recognized for Brady violations, Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. 
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Adoption of this new standard would work to support the new 
proposal for the ABA Prosecution Standards for Prosecutors, 
Standard 3-7.1, which would require that prosecutors “conduct a fair 
evaluation of post-trial motions . . . and not oppose motions that the 
prosecutor believes are correct, or solely for the purpose of 
preserving a conviction.” 88 
Police reforms are frequently difficult to implement, and one can 
anticipate objections to this one as well. First, the claim will be made 
that appointing another investigator is too time-consuming and 
costly. Indeed, there may be some additional expense if a new 
investigator evaluates a case. On the other hand, the costs of a 
wrongful conviction are immeasurable. Moreover, because the 
defendant has targeted the problems in the conviction by filing a 
petition, the cost of reinvestigating a case does not match the amount 
spent by the prosecution on the original search to secure a 
conviction. 
Second, law enforcement agents will likely complain that a 
defense investigator can too easily influence prosecution witnesses to 
change their testimony after trial in an effort to overturn a conviction. 
But if that is the case, then an independent investigator should be 
able to determine whether a witness’s retraction is legitimate or the 
result of harassment by the defense. Nothing prevents the 
independent investigator from consulting with the officers who 
conducted the initial investigation. Their insights might be valuable 
in the reinterview of the witness. However, ultimately, the post-
conviction investigation should be conducted by someone whose 
own investigative work is not the subject of the habeas claim. 
Third, law enforcement and prosecutors might complain that it is 
the role of the court, not the prosecutor, to evaluate the investigating 
officers’ conduct in the case. Therefore, the original investigating 
officer should be permitted to conduct the post-conviction review, 
and any biases in doing so will be revealed at an evidentiary hearing 
on the habeas claim. The problem with this approach is that very few 
habeas petitioners are granted evidentiary hearings. Rather, judges 
 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and even allegations of false testimony or prosecutorial or 
police misconduct. See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (setting forth 
harmless error standard and requirement of prejudice for post-conviction challenges). 
 88. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION Standard 3-7.1 (Draft 2010). 
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typically decide the petitions on the pleadings and declarations that 
both sides file. 89 An officer with a vested interest in ensuring that a 
conviction is not reversed may slant the government’s submission in 
a manner such that a court will never test the validity of the post-
conviction investigation. 
Fourth, there can be the problem of evaluating whether a habeas 
claim—especially one prepared by a pro se petitioner—is alleging 
police misconduct or simply insufficient evidence or problems with 
witnesses. It is true that some judgment calls will have to be made. 
However, the most egregious cases—such as those where an 
investigator’s reputation rides on preserving the testimony of a 
witness who now claims that the officer improperly tapped on a 
picture to obtain an identification—will at least have the chance of a 
proper investigation. 
Fifth, there are the questions of how and when the court should 
get involved in the assignment of investigators. Once a defendant 
files a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the court has jurisdiction in 
the matter. It is at that point that prosecutors should certify for the 
court that they have analyzed the petition and have determined 
 
 89. This is even truer under the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006), which affords a presumption that state court factual 
findings were accurate, regardless of whether the state court held a full evidentiary hearing to 
establish those facts. See Larry W. Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hearings Under the New Habeas 
Corpus Statute, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 135 (1996); Nancy J. King et al., Executive Summary: 
Habeas Litigation in the U.S. District Courts (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 07-21, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999389. Thirteen 
percent of non-capital habeas petitions claiming false, lost, or undisclosed evidence are afforded 
evidentiary hearings. King et al., supra, at 5. 
  As 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) provides: 
(1) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person 
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue 
made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the 
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 
(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court 
proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the 
applicant shows that— 
(A) the claim relies on— 
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or 
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the 
exercise of due diligence; and 
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would 
have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 
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whether their investigator had an impermissible conflict of interest in 
handling the post-conviction investigation. 
Finally, there is the issue of what remedy, if any, should there be 
if an investigator with a conflict of interest continues to handle a 
case. There is no simple answer. An investigator who is driven to 
preserve a wrongful conviction can continue to taint a case by, for 
example, intimidating witnesses in the post-conviction evidentiary 
hearings. But separation of powers cautions against having judges 
designate which investigators prosecutors must use. Thus, the courts 
should use the powers they already have to prevent a conflicted 
investigator from tainting a case. This may include not allowing the 
investigator to be present at other witnesses’ testimony during the 
evidentiary hearing or allowing extensive examination regarding the 
investigator’s conduct during the post-conviction investigation. It 
may also include asking prosecutors to certify that they have 
considered an investigator’s possible conflict of interest in assigning 
that investigator to a case’s post-conviction investigation. 
One would hope that common sense would lead prosecutors to 
use independent investigators—as opposed to those with conflicts of 
interest—without a formal rule dictating that they must do so. 90 
However, the evidence suggests otherwise. 91 Prosecutors commonly 
see themselves in a partnership with their investigating agents. 
Sometimes, it may be the investigator who appears to be the 
dominating partner. Under these conditions, it is difficult for a 
prosecutor to replace the investigator without creating the appearance 
that the prosecutor questions the officer’s integrity as well. The 
answer to this dilemma may be to provide prosecutors with ethical 
standards that will help them justify reassigning investigators and 
convey to others, including the police, that the prosecutor serves the 
public and the Constitution. “The prosecutor does not represent the 
victim of a crime, the police, or any individual. Instead, the 
prosecutor represents society as a whole. His goal is truth and the 
achievement of a just result.” 92 
 
 90. See Levenson, supra note 56, at 560–61. 
 91. Unfortunately, there are no studies yet on how often prosecutors use independent counsel 
for post-conviction investigations. A research study on that issue will be conducted in the summer 
of 2011. 
 92. Carol A. Corrigan, Commentary: On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 
537, 537–38 (1986) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Ethical issues can arise at any stage of a criminal proceeding. 
Most of the focus by the courts has been on ethical issues arising 
before or during trial. The system seems to breathe a sigh of relief 
once a conviction is affirmed and the burden shifts to the defendant 
to seek relief through a habeas corpus petition. 
However, we cannot be complacent. With the extraordinary 
number of wrongful convictions, prosecutors and police must also be 
zealous at the post-conviction stage to ensure that only those justly 
convicted remain in custody. A prosecutor’s responsibilities do not 
end with a trial verdict. Rather, as the new ethical standards 
recognize, a prosecutor has the responsibility to fairly and 
objectively study and evaluate post-conviction motions. 93 
Much more is at stake than an individual investigator or 
prosecutor’s fame or fortune. In The Killing Season, Corwin wrote 
how Detective Winn thought the case looked like a “loser” from the 
start, having “no decent witnesses and . . . no solid evidence.” 94 He 
described how she was increasingly frustrated as a month passed 
without any leads, how she was extremely nervous by late April, and 
how “[e]very morning, [when she] pores over the case at her desk 
and mutters to herself ‘I hope this trail hasn’t gone cold.’” 95 She “has 
to prove she belongs in homicide,” 96 that she has what it takes. 
Confronted with this unsolved murder, police focused on Obie 
Anthony and Reggie Cole because they were identified as 
perpetrators in another case—that was dismissed when the victim 
admitted he had lied to police and had never been carjacked or 
kidnapped. Winn relied on the only witness she could—Jones—who 
admitted in a declaration filed with Anthony’s petition that he had 
testified falsely. 
Winn, like many of her colleagues, is undoubtedly a zealous and 
dedicated officer. However, reliable investigative techniques require 
more. They require that an independent officer—not the officer 
whose findings and investigative techniques are being questioned—
conduct the post-conviction investigation. If prosecutors are not 
 
 93. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 60, Standard 3-7.1. 
 94. CORWIN, supra note 7, at 31. 
 95. Id. at 44. 
 96. Id. at 22. 
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doing this, then a rule should be adopted mandating that they do so. 
This new ethical provision would allow prosecutors to reassign 
investigations without antagonizing the original investigators 
because the “code” requires the reassignments. 
Conflict-of-interest rules are nothing new. What is new is that 
they need to be applied to officers’ personal conflicts, not just their 
financial or familial ones. It is time that such a rule be adopted. Fair 
and objective investigations depend on it. 
 
